

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/EEO				
14	D/Pers				
15	D/OEA				
16	C/PAD/OEA				
17	SA/IA		✓		
18	AO/DCI				
19	C/IPD/OIS				
20	AC/ACLS		✓		
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks:

State Dept. review completed.

Executive Secretary

Date


3637 (10-81)

215344



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



May 30, 1982..

UNCLASSIFIED (SECRET attachment)

MEMORANDUM TO: OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler  
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel  
CIA -   
JCS - MAJ Dennis J. Stanley  
OSD - COL John Stanford  
Negotiator - COL Samuel Watson

STAT

Subject: Report of START IG Meeting

Attached is the summary report of the May 26 meeting of the START IG.

  
L. Paul Bremer II  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

State Dept. review completed.UNCLASSIFIED (SECRET attachment)

B-223



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group  
on START Policy  
May 26, 1982

Principal ParticipantsState

RADM Jonathan T. Howe,  
Chairman

NSC

Sven Kraemer

ACDA

James Timbie

OSD

Richard Perle

CIAOVP

LTC Michael Fry

25X1

JCS

RADM William Williams

Negotiator

Ambassador Rowny

The IG agreed to begin a study of verification requirements and objectives for START negotiations. The Chairman of the START delegation was asked to report to the IG on progress on a draft treaty. The IG directed ACDA to begin drafting delegation instructions on the basis of decisions to date. The IG would also consider undertaking a study of the economic impact of START reductions on the US and USSR.

The IG also discussed papers prepared by the Working Group for submission to the NSC:

1) Force Reconstitution: The Working Group was directed to include a definition of refire missiles and to consider whether SLBM reconstitution capabilities should be limited. The intelligence community should provide more detailed background on monitoring uncertainties and verification requirements for options under consideration, and JCS should provide an analysis of the impact of geographical limitations and inventory limits on US forces. Options 2 and 4 should be included as consensus recommendations and the paper refocused on the pro's and cons of inventory limits.

SECRET

RDS-3 5-27-92

SECRET

-2-

2) Collateral Constraints: The Working Group should provide a graphic representation of the results of the various options for reducing Soviet throw-weight, and more precise definitions of heavy and medium ICBMs. The option of double-counting heavy ICBMs should be included as a variant of banning heavies. The Working Group should indicate the advantages and disadvantages of fractionation limits and provide a clearer presentation of the issue of limits on the relocation of fixed ICBM launchers and modifications to existing ICBM launchers. The Working Group should also continue to study limits on the size of new ICBM launchers and provide recommendations to the IG for submission to the NSC.

3) Crisis Communication and Reducing the Risk of War: The NSC should determine whether generalized language on this topic would be sufficient for inclusion in an initial Presidential speech dealing with the proposed initiative. The Working Group should draft suggested speech language and continue to develop the six options under consideration.

The IG also directed the Working Group to consider a definition of "deployed missiles" for uniform Administration guidance.

SECRET